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The	ongoing	transformations	of	power	systems	worldwide	pose	important	challenges,	
both	 economic	 and	 technical,	 for	 their	 appropriate	 planning	 and	 operation.	 A	 key	
approach	 to	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 of	 these	 systems	 is	 through	 demand-side	
management,	 i.e.,	 to	promote	the	active	 involvement	of	consumers	 in	the	system.	 In	
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vary	their	load	according	to	real-time	price	incentives,	offered	by	retailing	companies.	
Under	this	setting,	retail	competition	plays	an	 important	role	as	 inadequate	prices	or	
services	may	entail	consumers	switching	to	a	rival	retailer.	In	this	work	we	consider	a	
game	theoretical	model	where	asymmetric	retailers	compete	in	prices	to	increase	their	
profits	by	accounting	for	the	utility	function	of	consumers.	Consumer	preferences	for	
retailers	 are	 uncertain	 and	 distributed	 within	 a	 Hotelling	 line.	 We	 analytically	
characterize	 the	 equilibrium	 of	 a	 retailer	 duopoly,	 establishing	 its	 existence	 and	
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initial	market	shares,	 the	 resulting	equilibrium	can	range	 from	complete	competition	
to	one	 in	which	a	retailer	have	a	 leading	or	even	a	dominant	position	 in	 the	market,	
decreasing	 the	 consumers'	 utility	 significantly.	 Moreover,	 the	 retailer	 network	
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The ongoing transformations of power systems worldwide pose important challenges, both economic and
technical, for their appropriate planning and operation. A key approach to improve the e ciency of these
systems is through demand-side management, i.e., to promote the active involvement of consumers in the
system. In particular, the current trend it to conceive systems where electricity consumers can vary their load
according to real-time price incentives, o↵ered by retailing companies. Under this setting, retail competition
plays an important role as inadequate prices or services may entail consumers switching to a rival retailer.
In this work we consider a game theoretical model where asymmetric retailers compete in prices to increase
their profits by accounting for the utility function of consumers. Consumer preferences for retailers are
uncertain and distributed within a Hotelling line. We analytically characterize the equilibrium of a retailer
duopoly, establishing its existence and uniqueness conditions. Furthermore, sensitivities of the equilibrium
prices with respect to relevant model parameters are also provided. The duopoly model is extended to a
multiple retailer case for which we perform an empirical analysis via numerical simulations.
Results indicate that, depending on the retailer costs, loyalty rewards and initial market shares, the
resulting equilibrium can range from complete competition to one in which a retailer have a leading or even
a dominant position in the market, decreasing the consumers’ utility significantly. Moreover, the retailer
network configuration also plays an important role in the competitiveness of the system.
Key words : Elastic consumers, electricity market, hotelling line, market equilibrium, retail competition,
switching consumers.
1. Introduction
Over the last decades, electricity systems worldwide have experienced a set of transformations that
have notably modified their structure, operation and e ciency. In general, vertically integrated
systems, based on fossil-fuels technologies and with inelastic consumers, have evolved into com-
petitive markets with high penetration of renewable production and price-responsive consumers.
These transformations pose both economical and technical challenges to the market and system
operators.
From an economical perspective, the recent regularization of the electricity systems worldwide
has introduced market mechanisms to incorporate horizontal competition at the generation and
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distribution levels. In general, generating companies compete between them, at di↵erent trading
floors, to supply their energy at the highest prices possible to retailing companies or to large
consumers that participate in the market. Similarly, retailers compete with each other to buy their
energy at the same trading floors in order to supply it to the final consumers.
From a technical perspective, new generation technologies and consumption patterns are being
integrated into the electricity industry. Regarding the supply side of the system, it should be noted
the important growth of renewable generation, which is becoming more and more profitable as its
investment costs have been decreasing steadily over these past years. While the main advantages of
these new energy sources are their low generation and CO2 emission costs, most of them present a
stochastic nature so that their available production capacities are di cult to predict on a short-term
basis. The current practice in electricity systems is to use conventional fast-response generation
units, for instance, combined-cycle units, to compensate unexpected falls in renewable production
and to balance the system (total generation must match total demand load). However, this approach
presents several disadvantages related to the early wear of these units and the increase in the final
market prices.
One important approach to deal with these challenges is by promoting the active involvement
of consumers in the system. In particular, demand response, i.e., the altering of the consumer
load patterns as a reaction to specific incentives, is considered one of the main components of
this new paradigm (Kirschen 2003). An appropriate demand-side management can smooth load
peaks, mitigate short-term imbalances and improve the e ciency of the system. Among several
options, the most extended form of demand-side management is to create price incentives to the
consumers to switch their load. For instance, high prices can be assigned to peak-hours so that the
consumption is moved to di↵erent hours. In fact, the European Union and the USA distribution
system operators are actually investing a high amount of resources to promote pricing programs
such as real-time pricing (RTP), critical-price pricing (CPP) and time-of-use tari↵s (Mallet et al.
2014, U.S. Department Energy 2006, U.S. Gov. Policy Act 2005).
Thus, it is expected that in the coming years an important number of consumers would move
from systems with fixed consumption tari↵s to others in which the corresponding retailing company
would o↵er prices that are updated in real time. Under this framework, if several retailers have
access to the same area of the electricity system, they will have to compete to increase their
consumer market share. In that case, the retail competition in the electricity market becomes similar
to that in other industries, such as communications, banking, private health care, insurance, etc. As
electricity is a near-homogeneous good, in addition to the o↵ered price, retailers can also provide
complementary services to the consumers to di↵erentiate their products, for instance: reliability of
service, information technologies, loyalty programs, etc.
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Under this new setting, the role consumers play in the electricity market is increased. They can
adapt their consumption to changes in supply and demand and, moreover, they can switch to retail
companies with better services or conditions. To allow the growth in their customer base and to
retain existing customers, retail companies can o↵er incentives to reward the loyalty of consumers,
or implement switching costs if they decide to switch retailers (Farrel and Klemperer 2007).
In this work, we propose to model this setting as a game where retailers compete in prices to
increase their revenues in the long-term. Game-theoretical models have shown to be very suitable
to represent these types of competition, specially considering that, in most electricity markets, a
small number of retailers rule the market.
Specifically, we analyze the interaction and the possible equilibria between retailers that compete
to supply their energy to the final consumers in an electricity market. The aim of each retailer is to
maximize its profit: revenues from selling its energy to the consumers minus the costs of purchasing
it, by selecting an adequate retail price to o↵er to the consumers. In particular, we assume that
retailers have di↵erent purchasing costs as they follow their own strategy to buy this energy, for
instance, by participating in the electricity day-ahead market or through bilateral contracts with
the generating firms. Moreover, we consider that retailers are able to anticipate, in a Stakelberg
fashion, the reaction of the final consumers which seek to maximize their utility functions taking
into account the possible loyalty premiums that retailers may o↵er. Uncertainty is incorporated to
the problem by assuming that the consumer preferences for each retailer are uniformly distributed
on a Hotelling line (Hotelling 1929).
In summary, the main contributions of this work are sixfold:
1. To propose a game-theoretical model to represent the interactions between several retailers
and the final consumers in an electricity market. Retailers aim to maximize their profit while
consumers aim to maximize their utility functions.
2. To explicitly account for the loyalty incentives, or switching costs, that consumers may have
if they remain with their original retailers.
3. To provide an analytical characterization of the market equilibrium for the case of a retailer
duopoly.
4. To establish the existence and uniqueness conditions for a duopoly equilibrium that are valid
for a wide class of consumer utility functions.
5. To provide a sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to relevant problem
parameters.
6. To generalize this setting for the case of more that two retailers and perform an empirical
analysis via numerical simulations.
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The article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a literature review of retail compe-
tition in electricity markets and an economic analysis of loyalty premiums. Section 3 is dedicated
to study and characterize the equilibrium solutions for the duopoly case. Section 4 generalizes this
setting to the multiple retailers case. The empirical analysis is carried out in Section 5. Finally,
this work’s conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
Many engineering and operations research papers have analyzed the pricing decision process of
a retailer in an electricity market. For instance, a real-time pricing framework to ease peak load
hours in a smart grid is introduced in Qian et al. (2013), where a single retailer selects the best
pricing strategy anticipating the reaction of consumers. Similarly, Bu et al. (2013) proposes a game
theoretical model formulated as a four-stage problem to assist retailers in their pricing strategies
in a smart grid. Based in time-of-use tari↵s, Garc´ıa-Bertrand (2013) presents a risk-based pricing
tool for retailers to decrease the consumers’ load in those periods where pool prices are high. With
a similar aim, a risk-averse two-stage bilevel model is proposed in Wei et al. (2015) to be used by a
retailer to derive its optimal dispatch and retail prices. Specifically, a Stakelberg game is considered
to model demand response.
Most liberalized electricity markets include more than one retailing company that compete to
supply the final consumers. Thus, agent-based and game-theoretical models are generally used to
represent these interactions. This is the case of Mu¨ller et al. (2007), which presents an agent-
based model of the German retail market to study the interdependencies between retailers’ pricing
strategies and consumers’ participation in the market. Joskow and Tyrole (2006) studies the e↵ects
of combining retail competition and di↵erent consumer profiles. It is shown that, apart from the
absence of real-time meters, transaction costs and joint interruptibility can also hamper consumers
to react to real-time prices. A game-theoretical model to represent the equilibrium between multiple
retailers is introduced in Oliveira et al. (2013). Retailers buy their energy from generators at
di↵erent trading floors and sell it to the final consumers. However, the retail price is considered
unique and consumers are aggregated into a single demand curve.
Although these works notably contribute to address many of the challenges that are faced by
retailing firms, issues such as consumer loyalty incentives or switching costs, and their economical
implications, are in general not considered in the context of electricity markets. As explained in
the previous section, this is mainly because, until very recently, consumers have only exhibited a
passive role in electricity systems.
Nevertheless, there is an extensive marketing and economic literature that has addressed the
market implications of loyalty incentives or switching costs in other industries. See Farrel and
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Klemperer (2007) for a detailed review on this topic. In general, one of the most important questions
that arises with these incentives is whether they lead to higher or lower market prices. Two main
approaches have been used to answer this question: first, the consideration of analytical models,
which aim to reproduce either static or dynamic competition, and second, the use of empirical
analysis, based on simulations or in real-world data.
Regarding analytical models, the most widespread approach to represent product di↵erentiation
is via a Hotelling line (Hotelling 1929), where consumer preferences are distributed within a line
that connects two selling firms. Even if homogeneous products are considered, which is the case
for electricity, product di↵erentiation arises from asymmetric transportation costs (in this contest,
the concept “transportation costs” is used to quantify the consumer’s di↵erence in preferences for
each retailing firm, rather than physical or monetary costs). This model has become an standard
model in oligopolistic competition.
Although the original Hotelling model is restricted to the duopoly case, several extensions have
been proposed to represent oligopolistic markets. For instance, Chen and Riordan (2007) introduced
the spokes model where several oligopolistic firms interact simultaneously in a market with multiple
products. In particular, each selling firm competes directly with all other firms, even considering
that consumers are only interested in a maximum number of product varieties. An alternative
extension of the Hotelling model is presented in Somaini and Einav (2013), where more than two
firms can also be considered. The model assumes that each consumer is limited to buy from two
asymmetric firms. Due to its similarities with the current electricity retail market, some of these
models’ features are used in our numerical analysis to extend the duopoly case.
A dynamic duopoly model is presented in Doganoglu (2010) to study competition between firms.
Su cient conditions are provided for the existence of a Markov equilibrium. Results show that the
level of switching costs has an important impact on competition. In particular, when switching
costs are low, the resulting prices in the steady state can be lower than without switching costs. A
similar analysis is conducted in Rhodes (2014) where the conditions under which switching costs
may raise or decrease market prices are established for both the short and long-run. Specifically, it is
shown that switching costs are more likely to increase prices in the short-run. An extension of these
models is proposed in Chen et al. (2014) where firms in a duopoly are allowed to charge di↵erent
prices to their own consumers (customized pricing). Results indicate that increasing switching costs
(or decreasing loyalty rewards) may decrease firms’ profits.
Many empirical analyses have been carried out to show the impact of switching costs in di↵erent
industries (see Farrel and Klemperer (2007) for a complete revision). Related to the electricity
industry, Waterson (2003) studies the impact of consumers behavior in the industry performance.
Several case studies from di↵erent industries are analyzed, including the electricity market in the
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UK, to show that consumer switching costs have a relevant impact on market e ciency. In the
same vein, an empirical analysis to study the impact of switching costs is presented in Wilson and
Price (2010). The analysis of some databases from the UK electricity market shows that consumers’
ability to select the best retailer is limited. This suggests that, apart from purely economical
reasons, there are other factors that may condition consumer switching costs.
Compared to the above works, the main contributions of the proposed model are directly related
to considering electricity as our trading good. In particular, we use a general function for the
consumer utility which depends on the purchased quantity of electricity, represented as a continuous
variable. Note that most of the references assume a fixed quantity (or number of units) of the good
to be purchased and the only decision variable represents the choice of an appropriate retailing
firm. Additionally, we assume that the retailers are asymmetric as they follow their own strategy
when acquiring their electricity at di↵erent trading floors (with di↵erent prices). Under this general
setting we provide analytical results that characterize the equilibrium of the duopoly and extend
this framework numerically to a multiple-retailer case study.
3. Electricity market with two retailers
Consider an electricity market with two retailers, Ri and Rj, that sell their energy at prices, pi
and pj, respectively, to a set of consumers, C. To model the consumer preferences, we assume that
the two retailers are located at the ends of a Hotelling line (Hotelling 1929) of length 1, that is,
Ri is located at the beginning of the line and Rj at the end. Each consumer is placed at a given
position within the Hotelling line ✓ij 2 [0,1], so that the closer they are to Ri, i.e., the smaller ✓ij
is, the higher her preference to buy from Ri. Moreover, consumers are distributed along this line
by following a probability distribution, F (✓ij). Additionally, let ⇡ij (⇡ji) denote the proportion of
consumers with retailer Ri (Rj) at the initial state, where ⇡ij +⇡ji = 1.
For the sake of completeness, we will assume that the consumer utilities include a function u
that is a concave increasing function of the purchased energy qi   0, or qj   0, if the energy is
bought from Ri or Rj respectively, with continuous second derivatives. We will also assume that
it has an invertible first derivative u0(q)  0.
The utility maximization problem for a consumer that had bought from Ri at the initial state,
and decides to buy again from retailer Ri, is given by
max
qi
u(qi)  piqi  k✓ij +  i, (1)
where the second term represents the payments to Ri. Parameter k > 0 denotes the transportation
cost per unit of length and is used to quantify the preference levels of consumers with respect to each
retailer. In particular, the smaller the value of ✓ij the lower the transportation costs k✓ij, yielding an
Ruiz, Nogales and Prieto: Retail Competition with Switching Consumers in Electricity Markets
7
increased preference for retailer Ri for this consumer. This preference asymmetry may be caused by
the di↵erent services o↵ered by the retailers such as: quality and reliability of supply, information
technologies, technical support, flexible payments programs, etc. Note that the transportation
cost does not depend on the consumer’s actual retailing company. Another parameter,  i   0, is
introduced to represent a loyalty reward or premium, i.e., the obtained incentive by purchasing
again from Ri. Note that   i can also be viewed as a switching cost incurred if a consumer decides
to switch to Rj.
In particular, if this same consumer decides to switch to Rj, the problem she has to solve is
max
qj
u(qj)  pjqj   k✓ji, (2)
where ✓ji = 1   ✓ij is the Hotelling line distance between the consumer and Rj. The switching
decision is modeled by letting the term  i vanish from the utility function.
Similar problems can be obtained if the consumer initially bought from Rj by interchanging i
and j.
Regardless of the initial state, the optimal value of qk, where k= {i, j}, is obtained from u0(qk) =
pk as q⇤k = v(pk) ⌘ (u0) 1(pk), where v : [min(ci, cj);↵]! R+, and we use the notation ↵ = u0(0).
Under our assumptions, v is a nonnegative decreasing function of pk on its domain; also v(↵) = 0.
Each retailer Ri or Rj purchases their energy from the spot or futures market, at a cost ci or cj
and then, they sell the energy to the consumers at prices pi and pj, respectively.
Taking into account consumer preferences, retailers compete in prices trying to increase their
proportion of consumers from the initial values, ⇡ij and ⇡ji, respectively, by the optimization of
their utility functions. The following proposition shows the optimal strategy for each retailer to
attain this goal.
Proposition 1. The optimal strategy for retailer Ri, is defined through the solution of the follow-
ing problem
max
pi
uri (pi, pj) = (pi  ci)q⇤i (pi)⇡⇤i (pi, pj) (3)
where q⇤i (pi) = v(pi) is the optimal consumer energy, and ⇡
⇤
i (pi, pj) is the attained proportion of
consumers by retailer Ri defined as
⇡⇤i (pi, pj) = F
⇤
ij⇡ij +F
⇤
ji⇡ji, (4)
where F ⇤ij denotes the probability that a consumer who bought from retailer Ri remains with Ri and
F
⇤
ji the probability that a consumer who bought from retailer Rj switches to Ri. These probabilities
are obtained as follows
F ⇤ij = P (✓ij  ✓⇤ij), F
⇤
ji = P (✓ji > ✓
⇤
ji) (5)
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where
✓⇤ij =
1
2k
('(pi) '(pj)+ k+  i) . (6)
and '(pi)⌘ u(v(pi))  pv(pi) is a negative and decreasing function of pi that satisfies that '0(pi) =
 v(pi).
Proof: From (1) and (2), a consumer who bought from retailer Ri will remain with Ri if it
holds that
u(qi)  piqi  k✓ij +  i   u(qj)  pjqj   k✓ji, (7)
or equivalently if
✓ij  ✓⇤ij =
1
2k
('(pi) '(pj)+ k+  i) , (8)
On the other hand, a consumer who bought from retailer Rj will switch to Ri if
u(qi)  piqi  k✓ij >u(qj)  pjqj   k✓ji+  j, (9)
or equivalently if
✓ji > ✓
⇤
ji =
1
2k
('(pj) '(pi)+ k+  j) . (10)
⇤
Due to the symmetry of the problem, a proposition similar to Proposition 1 can be obtained, by
interchanging i and j, to characterize the optimal strategy of retailer Rj.
Retailer Ri’s problem (3) and its equivalent for retailer Rj are interrelated as both objective
functions depend on prices pi and pj, simultaneously. Under this setting, the following game and
associated Nash equilibrium can be defined:
Definition 1. (Nash equilibrium of the duopoly game) The game between the two retailers Ri
and Rj is defined when both players seek to determine their optimal pi and pj, respectively, to
maximize their profits (3). A Nash equilibrium would be reached if there exists a set of prices p⇤i
and p⇤j so that u
r
i (p
⇤
i , p
⇤
j )  uri (pi, p⇤j ) 8pi 2 Si and if urj(p⇤i , p⇤j ) urj(p⇤i , pj) 8pj 2 Sj, where Si and
Sj represent the feasible region for prices pi and pj.
3.1. Equilibrium price classification
In this section we classify and characterize the di↵erent types of equilibria that could be reached
in the market. Some definitions that will be used within this section are introduced below.
Definition 2. We say retailer Ri has a dominant position in the Hotelling line if, at equilibrium,
F ⇤ij = F
⇤
ji = 1. Or equivalently, if F
⇤
ji = F
⇤
ij = 0.
Note that in this case all consumers remain with or will switch to the dominant retailer, causing
a lack of competition in the market.
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Definition 3. We say retailer Ri has a leading position in the Hotelling line if, at equilibrium
prices, F ⇤ij = 1 but F
⇤
ji < 1. Or equivalently, if F
⇤
ji < 1 but F
⇤
ij = 0. In this latter case we say retailer
Rj has a following position.
This definition implies all consumers with the leading retailer remain with her, while a proportion
of consumers with the follower retailer switch. This causes some competition in the market, with
one retailer leading the other one.
Definition 4. We say there is complete competition in the Hotelling line if, at equilibrium prices,
0<F ⇤ij < 1 and 0<F
⇤
ji < 1.
This definition implies consumers have a certain probability to switch between retailers, allowing
more competitive equilibrium prices.
Hereafter, we assume consumer preferences are distributed along the Hotelling line following a
uniform distribution, that is, Fij(✓ij) = 0 for ✓ij < 0, Fij(✓ij) = ✓ij for 0 ✓ij  1, and Fij(✓ij) = 1
for ✓ij > 1.
According to the above definitions and depending on the di↵erent market settings, we distinguish
three types of equilibrium: dominant position, leading positions, and complete competition.
Proposition 2. If the following condition holds
'(pi) '(pj)  k+  j, (11)
then retailer Ri will have a dominant position in the Hotelling line and the optimal price is given
by (pi  ci)v0(pi)+ v(pi) = 0, while retailer Rj has no demand and gets no income.
The proof for this proposition can be found in the Appendix.
To state the following propositions, we need to define the following function of prices:
 (p; c) =  (p  c)v(p)'
0(p)
v(p)+ (p  c)v0(p)  '(p) (12)
The conditions under which a retailer will exhibit a leading position in the market are provided
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the following condition holds
'(pi) '(pj)  k   i, k+  j >'(pi) '(pj)  k+  j, (13)
then retailer Ri will have a leading position in the Hotelling line where the optimal (equilibrium)
prices satisfy the following conditions
 (pi; ci) =  '(pj)+ 1+⇡ij
⇡ji
k   j (14)
 (pj; cj) =  '(pi)+ k+  j, (15)
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Table 1 Di↵erent values of 
i j
Proposition 3
1+⇡ij
⇡ji
k   j k+  j
Proposition 4 k+⇡ij i ⇡ji j k ⇡ij i+⇡ji j
The proof for this proposition can be found in the Appendix.
Similarly, Proposition 4 below characterizes the complete competition case.
Proposition 4. Assuming that k  ( i+  j)/2, if the following condition holds
k   i  '(pi) '(pj)  k+  j, (16)
then the Hotelling line works under complete competition, where the optimal (equilibrium) prices
satisfy the following conditions
 (pi; ci) = '(pj)+ k+⇡ij i ⇡ij j (17)
 (pj; cj) = '(pi)+ k ⇡ij i+⇡ji j. (18)
The proof for this proposition can be found in the Appendix.
Under the assumption k   ( i +  j)/2, the case where both retailers have a leading position
(F ⇤ij > 1 and F
⇤
ji > 1 or equivalently ✓
⇤
ij > 1 and ✓
⇤
ji > 1) is not possible, so it is not considered as
a potential equilibrium in this work. Additionally, symmetric equilibria can be characterized from
propositions 2 and 3 by interchanging retailer Ri by Rj.
The equilibrium prices for the preceding competitive cases in Propositions 3 and 4 (we exclude
the dominant position from Proposition 2), can be obtained by solving a system of equations of
the form
 (pi; ci) = '(pj)+i (19)
 (pj; cj) = '(pi)+j, (20)
for i and j values depending on k,  i,  j, ⇡ij and ⇡ji (but independent of pi and pj). Table 1
presents the di↵erent values of .
In the following, we will exploit this mathematical structure to study the existence and unique-
ness of the equilibrium prices.
3.2. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium prices
In this section we characterize the solution of the system (19) and (20), which determines the
equilibria solutions for the market configurations where there is some degree of competition, i.e.,
the cases described within Propositions 3 and 4.
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To conduct this study, we will introduce some conditions on the consumers utility function u(q).
In what follows, we will make use of the notation c˜=min(ci, cj).
We define the following conditions:
C.1 We assume that u(0) = 0 and there exists q˜ such that u0(q˜) = c˜.
C.2 We assume that u is three times continuously di↵erentiable on [0; q˜], that it is nondecreasing
and concave (u00(q)  0) on [0; q˜], and that it has an invertible first derivative u0(q)   0 on that
interval.
C.3 We impose the following condition on u000,
u000(v(p))
u00(v(p))2
 1
p  c˜  
1
v(p)u00(v(p))
.
Conditions C.1 and C.2 are standard. A first interpretation of condition C.3 is that the function
u should not change curvature too fast. Note that a su cient condition for C.3 is u000(q) 0; also,
if the function u satisfies condition C.2 on [0,1) and the sign of u000(q) is constant for all large q,
then it must hold u000(q) 0 for large q.
Our first result is related to the function   defined above, which using '0(p) =  v(p) can be
written as
 (p; c)⌘ (p  c)v(p)
2
v(p)+ (p  c)v0(p)  '(p). (21)
The following two lemmas characterize key analytical properties of  (p; c) that are needed to
prove the existence of equilibrium.
Lemma 1. For p2 [c;↵],  (p;↵, c) defined in (21) has at least one vertical asymptote.
Proof: This result follows from the continuity of d(p; c) = v(p)+ (p  c)v0(p) and the properties
that d(c; c) = v(c)> 0 and d(↵; c) = v(↵)+ (↵  c)v0(↵) = (↵  c)v0(↵)< 0, as v(↵) = 0 and v0(↵) =
1/u00(v(↵)) = 1/u00(0)< 0 from Condition C.2. ⇤
In what follows we will use the notation
⌧(c)⌘min{! : d(!; c) = 0,! 2 [c;↵]} ,
for the first pole of   on [c;↵].
An illustration of a plot for a particular realization of function   can be seen in Figure 1.
Lemma 2. For p2 [c; ⌧(c)),  (p; c) defined in (21) is a continuous monotonically increasing func-
tion taking values in [ '(c);1).
Proof: The derivative of   can be written as
 0(p; c) = v+
v(p  c)
(v+(p  c)v0)2
  vv0+(p  c)(v0)2  (p  c)vv00)  . (22)
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Figure 1 A particular realization of the   function.
From Condition C.2, on [c; ⌧) we have that v has continuous first and second derivatives, with v(p)>
0 and v0(p)< 0. Also, as v0(p) = 1/u00(v(p)) and v00(p) = u000(v(p))v0(p)/(u00(v(p)))2, Condition C.3
implies
(p  c)v(p)v00(p) vv0+(p  c)(v0)2,
and as a consequence  0(p; c)> 0 on [c; ⌧). ⇤
The following result proves the existence of solutions for the system of equations of interest,
 (pi; ci) =  '(pj)+i (23)
 (pj; cj) =  '(pi)+j, (24)
for i and j defined in Table 1, under the following condition:
C.4 The values i satisfy
i  '(cj) '(ci), j  '(ci) '(cj).
In other words, Theorem 1 below proves the existence of equilibrium solutions for the retailers
pricing game for two cases: i) when one of the retailers has a leading position in the market
(Proposition 3) and ii) when there is complete competition (Proposition 4). This result completes
all the possible market configurations, as the dominant retailer case was already characterized in
Proposition 2.
Theorem 1. Under Conditions C.1–C.4, there exists at least a solution for the system (23)–(24).
Furthermore, this solution is in [ci; ⌧(ci))⇥ [cj; ⌧(cj)).
The proof for this theorem can be found in the Appendix.
The next step is to establish the uniqueness of the preceding fixed point. To prove this we need
to start by tightening Condition C.3.
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Define
⇢(p; c)⌘ p  c
(v+(p  c)v0)2
  vv0+(p  c)(v0)2  (p  c)vv00)  . (25)
Also, let
c¯i ⌘ G( '(ci)+i; ci)  ci
c¯j ⌘ G( '(cj)+j; cj)  cj.
These values have the property that the iterates generated by the fixed-point equations (EC.7)–
(EC.8) lie in [c¯k; ⌧(ck)) for k= i, j. We also define c¯⌘min(c¯i, c¯j) and ⌧¯ ⌘max(⌧(ci), ⌧(cj)).
Condition C.3 is replaced with
C.3’ The values of u, ck and k for k = i, j are such that for all p 2 [c¯k; ⌧(ck)), k = i, j, it holds
that
1+ ⇢(p; ck)>
s
v(c¯)
v(⌧¯)
.
As condition C.3 is equivalent to requiring
⇢(p; ck)  0,
and v(c¯)> v(⌧¯), condition C.3’ can be interpreted as a tightening of C.3.
Another motivation to introduce the c¯k values is that while it holds that ⇢(ck; ck) = 0, we have
⇢(c¯k; ck)  0.
The following theorem establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium solutions for the retailers
pricing game: i) the leading retailer case (Proposition 3) and ii) for the complete competition case
(Proposition 4).
Theorem 2. Under Conditions C.1, C.2, C.3’ and C.4, the solution of (23)–(24) on [c¯i; ⌧(ci))⇥
[c¯j; ⌧(cj)) is unique.
The proof for this theorem can be found in the Appendix.
3.3. Sensitivity analysis
In this section we provide some guidelines on how to compute sensitives of the equilibrium prices
with respect to the problem parameters. To this end, consider our fixed-point iteration (23)–(24),
written in the form
 (pi; ci)+'(pj) = i (26)
 (pj; cj)+'(pi) = j, (27)
for i and j given by (1).
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Let ⌫ denote any of the parameters k,  i,  j, ⇡ij, ⇡ji. The sensitivity of the equilibrium prices
with respect to ⌫ can be found from the solution of
 0(pi; ci)
@pi
@⌫
+'0(pj)
@pj
@⌫
=
@i
@⌫
 0(pj; cj)
@pj
@⌫
+'0(pi)
@pi
@⌫
=
@j
@⌫
.
Using (EC.12), we can rewrite these equations as
(1+ ⇢(pi; ci))
@pi
@⌫
  v(pj)
v(pi)
@pj
@⌫
=
1
v(pi)
@i
@⌫
  v(pi)
v(pj)
@pi
@⌫
+(1+ ⇢(pj; cj))
@pj
@⌫
=
1
v(pj)
@j
@⌫
.
From (22), under Condition C.3 we have that ⇢k   0 (k= i, j), and under mild additional condi-
tions (also under Condition C.3’, for example), ⇢k > 0 and the coe cient matrix in the preceding
system is invertible. The values of interest are given by
v(pi) ij
@pi
@⌫
= ⇢(pj; cj)
@i
@⌫
+
@i
@⌫
+
@j
@⌫
v(pj) ij
@pj
@⌫
= ⇢(pi; ci)
@j
@⌫
+
@i
@⌫
+
@j
@⌫
,
where  ij = ⇢(pi; ci)+ ⇢(pj; cj)+ ⇢(pi; ci)⇢(pj; cj).
For example, for ⌫ ⌘ ⇡ij and from (1) it will hold that
@i/@⌫ @j/@⌫
Proposition 3 1
⇡j
k 0
Proposition 4  i   i
and for the case in Proposition 4:
v(pi) ij
@pi
@⇡i
= ⇢(pj; cj) i
v(pj) ij
@pj
@⇡j
=  ⇢(pi; ci) i,
implying in particular @pi/@⇡ij > 0 and @pj/@⇡ij < 0. The higher the initial proportion of consumers
that a retailer has, the higher the prices he can set at the equilibrium.
By following a similar reasoning we can compute the signs associated to the rest of price sensi-
tivities, for the two market setting where competition is present:
@pi
@⇡ij
@pi
@⇡ji
@pj
@⇡ij
@pj
@⇡ji
@pi
@k
@pj
@k
@pi
@ i
@pi
@ j
@pj
@ i
@pj
@ j
Proposition 3 > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 < 0 = 0 > 0
Proposition 4 > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
We obtain that the transportation costs k always have a positive relationship with the equilibrium
prices. For the competitive case in Proposition 4, an increase of  i leads to an increment on the
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price o↵ered by retailer Ri while decreasing the price o↵ered by the competitor Rj. However, for
the market described in Proposition 3, as Ri is the leader, its  i does not have a direct impact on
prices. Additionally, it should be noted that, for the case described in Proposition 3, @pi/@⇡ij > 0
and @pj/@⇡ij > 0, indicating that an increase in the initial market share of the leader gives rise to
simultaneous increases for both the leader’s and follower’s price, as the later cannot capture any
of the leader’s consumers (it lacks any incentive to decrease prices).
These and other relevant sensitivities will be further studied in Section 5 for a particular real-
ization of the consumers’ utility function u(q).
4. Electricity market with more than two retailers: network
In this section we extend the previous duopoly model to include additional retailers. In particular,
we assume that retailers are located at the nodes of a pairwise network while consumer are dis-
tributed within the Hotelling lines connecting these nodes. Similar to Somaini and Einav (2013),
we consider that each consumer can only buy electricity from the two retailers located at the two
ends of her corresponding line. We adopt this simplification for the sake of clarity and to ease
the computational burden of the model. Nevertheless, this framework is very similar to the actual
retail market in many countries where, despite the existence of many retailing companies, these
are distributed within the electricity network so that consumers have only an small set of options
to sign contracts with.
We have a network with a set of retailers, N = {1,2, . . . ,N}, and a set of lines, L= {1,2, . . . ,L}.
For each line ij 2L we have di↵erent types of consumers with preferences ✓ij over the corresponding
Hotelling line. Because consumers in the same line are equivalent, we have
✓ij + ✓ji = 1. (28)
Each retailer purchases their energy from the spot or futures market, at a cost ci, for i= 1, . . . ,N .
Then, they sell the energy to all the consumers at a unique price pi.
The consumers are shared through the network with initial proportions ⇡0ij = ⇡
0
ji for each line
ij 2L, withPi,j>i ⇡0ij = 1. And for each line, let ⇡ij and ⇡ji = 1 ⇡ij denote the initial proportion
of consumers within that line with Ri and Rj, respectively.
The following proposition shows the optimal strategy for each retailer to increase its proportion
of consumers.
Proposition 5. The optimal strategy for retailer Ri, for i= 1, . . . ,N , is defined through the solu-
tion of the following problem
max
pi
uri (pi, p i) = (pi  ci) q⇤i (pi) ⇡⇤i (pi, p i) (29)
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where q⇤i (pi) = v(pi) is the optimal consumer energy, and ⇡
⇤
i (pi, p i) is the attained proportion of
consumers by retailer Ri defined as
⇡⇤i (pi, p i) =
X
j2Ni
⇡⇤ij(pi, p i)⇡
0
ij (30)
where Ni denotes the set of retailers adjacent to Ri and
⇡⇤ij(pi, p i) = F
⇤
ij⇡ij +F
⇤
ji⇡ji (31)
is the proportion of consumers in line ij that buy from Ri where F ⇤ij and F
⇤
ji are defined in Propo-
sition 1.
The proof is equivalent to that for Proposition 1.
The analytical characterization of the equilibrium prices of the multiple retailer framework is
more complex than in the duopoly case. Hence, we will limit our analysis to a numerical case study.
The equilibrium prices will be computed by solving simultaneously the optimality conditions for
all the retailers, i.e., we solve the following nonlinear system of equations
@uri (pi, p i)
@pi
= 0 8i= 1, . . . ,N. (32)
To make sure that the above system provides equilibrium prices, an iteration of a diagonalization
solution algorithm is performed, where retailers solve iteratively their profit maximization problems
assuming that the rival prices are fixed. If no retailer deviates unilaterally from their price strategy,
then the resulting set of prices can be considered as a Nash equilibrium. Additionally, for the sake of
clarity we will only present results for market settings in which all the retailers have a competitive
position in the market (a case analogous to Proposition 4).
5. Empirical analysis
In this section we perform a set of numerical analyses to better understand the impact of di↵er-
ent model parameters on the equilibrium market outcomes. First, we focus our analysis on the
duopolistic case and then we extend it to the multiple-retailers case.
5.1. Duopoly case
5.1.1. Data In this case study we use a particular realization of the consumers’ utility function
u(q) in (1). In particular, we have adopted a quadratic formulation, which is an standard assumption
within the electricity markets literature Oliveira et al. (2013), Kirschen (2003). Hence, we consider
that u(q) = ↵q  1
2
 q2. This is a concave function for     0 which meets the existence and uniqueness
equilibrium conditions discussed in Theorem 1 and, for appropriate values of the parameters, also
those of Theorem 2.
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Figure 2 Demand curve Spanish day-ahead electricity market (12:00, 04/08/2015) and its linear approximation
To obtain realistic market outcomes, we have adjusted the demand parameters by using data
from a real world electricity market: the Spanish electricity market OMIE (2015). Fig. 2 represents
the day-ahead aggregated demand for the Spanish market for a selected day and hour. The demand
curve can be identified as the consumers’ marginal utility, which for our case is a linear curve, i.e.,
P = @u(q)
@q
= ↵  q. Hence, we approximate the elastic part of the demand by this marginal utility
(dash line) which renders ↵= 480 euros/MWh and   = 0.012 euros/MWh2. Observe that to make
this approximation we have assumed that the Spanish demand function is directly submitted by
the consumers, without intermediate retailers. This is not completely true in the Spanish case as a
significant part of the day-ahead energy is traded by retailers in the market. However, retailers are
supposed to transfer the final consumers’ demand to the market (by including an small revenue
margin) so that the main behavior of the consumers demand can be assumed to be that of Fig. 2.
For the base case we assume that retailer Ri is able to purchase its energy in the futures or
day-ahead market at a overall cheaper price than retailer Rj so that ci = 40 euros/MWh and
cj = 47 euros/MWh. Furthermore, we fix the initial market share of each retailer at 50%, i.e.,
⇡ij = 1 ⇡ji = 0.5.
The selection of adequate values for the transportation costs k and the loyalty rewards  i and  j is
not straightforward, as there is not much real data available for electricity markets (Waterson 2003).
Therefore, the values for k,  i and  j, have been selected so that: a) they have a significant impact
on the consumers utility functions (1) and (2) and b) they meet the condition k  ( i+ j)/2, which
was required by propositions 3 and 4 to avoid unrealistic equilibria. We assume that k = 150000
euros,  i = 70000 euros and  j = 30000 euros. Observe that retailer Ri has a better position in the
market as it presents lower costs ci and higher loyalty premiums  i than Rj.
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5.1.2. Impact of ⇡ij First we analyze the impact of the initial market share of retailer Ri (⇡ij)
on the market equilibrium outcomes. Results are presented in Fig. 3. For the range ⇡ij 2 (0,0.385),
Ri has a leading position in the market (Proposition 3) while for ⇡ij   0.385 there is complete
competition (Proposition 4). This is a counterintuitive result that indicates that a retailer may
lose market power if it increases its initial market share.
This behavior can be explained by analyzing the prices o↵ered by each retailer. If the prices
o↵ered by the leader Ri are too high Fig. 3(a), consumers, initially attached to the leader, will
start to consider again the possibility to switch to Rj, opening competition and altering the market
equilibrium. In general, as Ri has lower costs, it is able to o↵er lower prices than Rj for both
the leader and complete competition cases. In particular, for the leader case (⇡ij 2 (0,0.385)) an
increase of ⇡ij increases both pi and pj dramatically. However, if the market enters into complete
competition, there is a discrete negative jump on both prices and only the leader’s price pi increases
again with ⇡ij. Note that these price trends are coherent with the sensitivity analysis performed
in Section 3.3.
The resulting market share for each retailer is presented in Fig. 3(b). The appreciable increase on
prices in the leader’s case entails an small decrease on the leader’s market share which is corrected
as the market enters complete competition. However, observe that retailer Ri’s profit, specially
when she acts as a leader, always increases with its initial market share (Fig 3(c)), although there
is a discrete decrease when the market enters complete competition. Despite its initial market share
decrease, retailer Rj’s profit also increases in the leader case, as she indirectly benefits from the
rise of prices.
Finally, Fig. 3(d)) presents the consumers utility, which decreases as the leader increases its
initial market share but increases again when the market enters complete competition.
5.1.3. Impact of  i The impact of the loyalty reward  i of retailer Ri on the di↵erent market
outcomes is presented in Fig. 4.
The market is in complete competition if  i 2 (0,71000) euros, and Ri becomes the leader for
values  i   71000 that imply that is able to “lock-in” its consumers. Observe that once  i   71000
the loyalty reward  i no longer has an impact on the market.
Regarding the retail prices (Fig. 4(a)), an increase of  i allows Ri to charge higher prices to
its consumers while Rj needs to reduce its price to be more competitive. Again, once the market
leaves complete competition there is a discrete increase for both prices.
Similarly, for the complete competition case, the market share (Fig. 4(a)) of Ri increases with
its loyalty reward while it decreases for Rj. For the leading case Ri’s market share drops slightly
to 0.7, as the price o↵ered (Fig. 4(a)) for this range of values of  i is very high. The overall e↵ect
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Figure 3 Impact of ⇡ij on the equilibrium market outcomes
is that Ri’s profit significantly increases with  i (Fig. 4(c)). Observe that Rj also benefits from the
overall higher prices in the leading case by increasing its profit.
Finally, consumers’ utility increases with  i as more consumers stay with Ri, which is the cheaper
producer. However, consumers utility drops significantly when the market leaves complete compe-
tition.
5.1.4. Impact of ci Fig. 5 presents the impact of the retailerRi’s cost on the market outcomes,
where we assume that both retailers o↵er the same loyalty rewards:  i =  j = 50000 euros. When
retailer Ri’s costs ci are su ciently low, ci  38.8 euros/MWh (remember that Rj cost is cj = 47
euros/MWh), then it can act as a leader. On the contrary, when ci   38.8 euros/MWh the market
enters complete competition.
Both retail prices increase with ci, although they drop when the market enters complete com-
petition. When ci = cj = 47 euros/MWh both retailers o↵er the same price as their positions are
symmetric.
Ruiz, Nogales and Prieto: Retail Competition with Switching Consumers in Electricity Markets
20
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x 104
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
γi [euros]
Re
tai
l p
ric
es 
[eu
ros
/M
W
h]
 
 
Ri
Rj
Ri LeaderComplete competition
(a) Retail prices
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x 104
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
γi [euros]
Pr
op
ort
ion
 of
 C
on
su
me
rs
 
 
Ri
Rj
Ri LeaderComplete competition
(b) Proportion of consumers
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x 104
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3 x 10
5
γi [euros]
Pr
ofi
ts 
[eu
ros
]
 
 
Ri
Rj
Ri LeaderComplete competition
(c) Retailers’ Profits
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x 104
7.72
7.74
7.76
7.78
7.8
7.82
7.84
7.86
7.88
7.9
7.92 x 10
6
γi [euros]
Co
ns
um
ers
 ut
ilit
y [
eu
ros
]
Ri LeaderComplete competition
(d) Consumers utility
Figure 4 Impact of  i on the equilibrium market outcomes.
The increase of ci implies a decrease in its market share (Fig. 5(b)) and its profit (Fig. 5(c)) as
it becomes less competitive with respect to Rj, which simultaneously increases its market share
and its profit.
Finally, an increase in the retailer costs always decreases the consumers’ utility (Fig. 5(d)).
However, if there is a leader, an small increase in its costs may have a beneficial e↵ect as the market
may enter complete competition.
5.2. Multiple-retailers
In this section we extend the numerical analysis to the multiple retailers case presented in Section
4. In what follows, we will study the impact of the cost ci and the loyalty incentive  i on the market
equilibrium outcomes, under di↵erent network configurations.
5.2.1. Data For the base case, we consider four retailers (R1, R2, R3 and R4) that supply
energy to the final consumers. We assume that the retailer costs are c1 = 40, c2 = 42, c3 = 45 and
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Figure 5 Impact of ci on the equilibrium market outcomes.
c4 = 48 euros/MWh. Furthermore, we assume symmetric loyalty premiums so that  1 =  2 =  3 =
 4 = 50000 euros, and transportation costs k= 150000 euros.
We analyze the market equilibrium under the three network configurations shown in Fig. 6.
Note that a connection between Ri and Rj represents a Hotelling line so that consumers located
in that line can buy their energy only from Ri or Rj. In the first case depicted in Fig. 6(a), there
are connections between all retailers implying that there exists one group of consumers for each
combination of any two retailers. The second case considers a linear network (Fig. 6(a)) where
there are three groups of consumers that can buy from R1 or R2, from R1 or R4 and from R3 or
R4, respectively. Finally, the third case assumes that there are two isolated groups of retailers and
consumers. The first group of consumers can select between R1 and R2 while the second one selects
between R3 and R4.
In all these three cases, we assume that consumers are initially uniformly distributed along the
existing lines and, for each line, the initial proportion of consumers that bought from each retailer
is 0.5. More specifically, for the first case: ⇡0ij = 1/6 and ⇡ij = 1/2 for i= 1,2,3,4, j = 1,2,3,4 and
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(a) All connected (b) Linear (c) Isolated
Figure 6 Network configurations
i 6= j. For the second case: ⇡0ij = 1/3 and ⇡ij = 1/2 for (i, j) = ({1,2},{1,4},{3,4}). For the third
case: ⇡0ij = 1/2 and ⇡ij = 1/2 for (i, j) = ({1,2},{3,4}).
For the sake of clarity, all the solutions presented within the following sections correspond to
market equilibria with complete competition, i.e., no retailer acts as a leader in any of the Hotelling
lines.
5.2.2. Impact of  i In this section we analyze the impact of the value of retailer R2’s loyalty
reward  2 on some market outcomes. Fig. 7 represents how retail prices evolve with  2 for the three
network configurations shown in Fig. 6. As observed in the duopoly case, the retail price o↵ered by
R2 increases with its loyalty reward while the prices o↵ered by its rivals decrease. This influence is
stronger for the case in which all of the retailers are connected (Fig. 7(a)) and becomes less relevant
as the network gets less connected (Fig. 7(c)). Similarly, the di↵erence between the retailer prices
(maximum minus minimum price) increases as consumers are more isolated.
A similar behavior is observed when analyzing the market shares for each retailer (Fig. 8).
Retailer R2 increases its market share with  2 while decreasing those of its competitors. It is relevant
to notice that the linear network configuration is specially favorable to retailer R1 as it supplies
energy to two groups of consumers, while being the cheapest retailer in both Hotelling lines. On
the contrary, retailer R4, that is also present in two Hotelling lines, cannot attain a significant
market share as it o↵ers the highest prices.
The profits for each retailer and network configuration are presented in Fig. 9. Retailer R2’s
profits increase with greater values of its loyalty reward  2. The rest of retailers decrease their
profit, although this e↵ect disappears for retailers R3 and R4 if they are isolated from retailer R2
(Fig. 9(c)). Again, we can observe that the linear network configuration is beneficial for retailer R1
as it achieves significantly greater profits than its rivals.
The consumers’ utility is presented in Fig. 10. For the three cases considered, the utility increases
with  2 where the worst configuration is the isolated network. However, for small values of  2 the
linear case yields higher utility values, while for bigger values of  2 the all-connected case o↵ers
better results. This can be explained by noticing that in the linear case, half of the consumers are
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Figure 7 Impact of  2 on equilibrium prices.
with retailer R1, which o↵ers the cheapest prices. Hence, if  2 is not su ciently large, this case
would be preferable for consumers. However, R2 has a greater market share in the all-connected
configuration so that further increasing its  2 would yield a higher impact on consumers’ utilities.
5.2.3. Impact of ci Now we study how the cost increment of one retailer, in particular retailer
R2’s cost c2, a↵ects prices, market shares and profits.
Fig. 11 depicts the retail prices for di↵erent network configurations. An increment in retailer
R2 cost yields higher prices for all retailers, although this increment is bigger for R2. Again, a
more interconnected network (Fig. 11(a)) implies more homogeneous retail prices, but at the same
time prices are more sensitive to variations in a single retailer costs. For the isolated network (Fig.
11(c)), retailers R3 and R4 are not a↵ected by c2.
Fig. 12 presents the retailers’ market shares. The cost increment of R2 makes it less competitive,
thus reducing its market share while increasing its rivals’ ones. This e↵ect is mitigated for retailers
R3 and R4 for the isolated case (Fig. 12(c)).
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Figure 8 Impact of  2 on quilibrium market shares.
As Fig. 13 shows, the trend for profits is similar to the trend for market shares. Retailer R2’s
profits decrease with its costs, while rival retailers benefit from the reduction in R2’s competitive-
ness. In particular, retailer R1, which has the lowest costs, also presents the largest profit increases
as it is always connected to R2.
Finally, consumer utilities decrease with the increment of retailer R2 costs. As it was observed
before, the worst network configuration is when R1 and R2 are isolated from R3 and R4. For small
values of c2, the maximum utility is achieved for the all-connected network. However, as c2 increases
the linear configuration is preferable, since the high prices o↵ered by R2, which is located at one
extreme of the network, find it more di cult to have an e↵ect on the other retailers.
6. Conclusions
We have proposed a game theoretical framework to analyze the interactions between retailers and
consumers in an electricity market.
Retailers seek to maximize their profit by selecting the optimal prices to o↵er to the consumers.
This is achieved by anticipating the optimal response of the consumers, which maximize their utility
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Figure 9 Impact of  2 on retailer’s profits.
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Figure 10 Impact of  2 on consumers’ utility.
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Figure 11 Impact of c2 on prices
by deciding their optimal load quantity. Additionally, we account for the loyalty incentives that
consumers may lose if they decide to switch from their original retailer. Uncertainty is incorporated
to our model by assuming that consumer preferences for each retailer lay in a Hotelling line.
For a retailer duopoly, we analytically characterize the equilibrium, providing price sensitivities as
well as existence and uniqueness conditions that hold for a wide class of consumer utility functions.
The duopoly is extended to a general case where several retailers located in a network compete
simultaneously for groups of consumers.
We have performed an empirical analysis via numerical simulation to show how the di↵erent
model parameters as well as the di↵erent network configurations impact the equilibrium market
outcomes.
As highlights for the general duopoly case, and depending on the market conditions, the resulting
price equilibrium can be classified into three categories: i) dominant position of a retailer; ii) leading
position of a retailer; iii) complete competition; each of which with di↵erent market implications.
The numerical simulations show how deviating from the complete competition case implies higher
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Figure 12 Impact of c2 on market shares
retail prices, higher retailer profits and lower consumer utilities. This deviation can be caused by
an increase in a retailer’s loyalty reward or by a decrease in a retailer costs. Moreover, results
indicate that an increase in the initial market share of a leading retailer may be beneficial for the
consumers as the market equilibrium may move to complete competition.
In the multiple-retailers case, a fully connected network, i.e., there exist groups of consumers
that can select between any pair of retailers, entails that equilibrium prices are more homogeneous
than in an incomplete network.
It should be noted that an increase of a retailer’s loyalty reward increases the margin to raise its
price while forcing its rivals to decrease theirs. Furthermore, if a retailer purchases its energy at
higher costs, it is forced to set higher retail prices. However, in this case rival retailers benefit from
this competitiveness decrease by also raising their retail prices. These e↵ects are more relevant as
the network is more connected. From a consumer’s perspective, the worst network configuration is
when retailers are isolated from each other. Under this setting, retailers can further exercise their
market power over their corresponding consumers.
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Figure 13 Impact of c2 on retailer’s profits
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Proofs of Statements
Proof for PROPOSITION 2:
From (8) and (10) we can check that, under condition (11), it holds that
✓⇤ij > 1 and ✓
⇤
ji  0,
implying F ⇤ij = 1 and F
⇤
ji = 0, with satisfies Definition 2 of a dominant position of retailer Ri.
For retailer Ri, from (4) we get ⇡⇤i (pi, pj) = 1 and thus the optimal utility becomes
uri (pi, pj) = (pi  ci)v⇤(pi) (EC.1)
and attains its maximum for a price pi that satisfies
(pi  ci)v0(pi)+ v(pi) = 0. (EC.2)
For retailer Rj, because ⇡⇤j (pj, pi) = 0, the optimal utility vanishes and thus the profit regardless
of the price pj. ⇤
Proof for PROPOSITION 3:
From (8) and (10), we can check that under condition (13), we have
✓⇤ij   1 and 0< ✓⇤ji < 1,
implying F ⇤ij = 1 and F
⇤
ji = ✓
⇤
ji.
Hence, from (4) we get, ⇡⇤i (pi, pj) = ⇡ij + (1  ✓⇤ji)⇡ji for retailer Ri and ⇡⇤j (p1, p2) = ⇡ji ✓⇤ji for
retailer Rj. The respective utilities become
uri (pi, pj) = (pi  ci)v⇤(pi)(⇡ij +(1  ✓⇤ji)⇡ji) (EC.3)
urj(pi, pj) = (pj   cj)v⇤(pj)(⇡ji✓⇤ji). (EC.4)
By considering (8) and (10), the first order conditions associated to maximize (EC.3) and (EC.4),
with respect to pi and pj, respectively, yields
(v(pi)+ (pi  ci)v0(pi)) (2k⇡ij +⇡ji('(pi) '(pj)+ k   j))+⇡ji(pi  ci)v(pi)'0(pi) = 0
(v(pj)+ (pj   cj)v0(pj)) (2k⇡ji ⇡ji('(pi) '(pj)+ k   j))+⇡ji(pj   cj)v(pj)'0(pj) = 0.
Using the definition (12) the above conditions can be rewritten as
 (pi; ci) = '(pj)+ 1+⇡ij
⇡ji
k   j
 (pj; cj) = '(pi)+ k+  j.
⇤
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Proof for PROPOSITION 4:
Under condition (16) we have
0< ✓⇤ij < 1 and 0< ✓
⇤
ji < 1,
implying F ⇤ij = ✓
⇤
ij and F
⇤
ji = ✓
⇤
ji.
By using (4) we get ⇡⇤i (pi, pj) = ✓
⇤
ij ⇡ij +(1  ✓⇤ji)⇡ji, and ⇡⇤j (pi, pj) = ✓⇤ji ⇡ji+(1  ✓⇤ij)⇡ij. Thus,
the profit function for each retailer becomes
uri (pi, pj) = (pi  ci)v⇤(pi)(✓⇤ij ⇡ij +(1  ✓⇤ji)⇡ji) (EC.5)
urj(pi, pj) = (pj   cj)v⇤(pj)(✓⇤ji ⇡ji+(1  ✓⇤ij)⇡ij). (EC.6)
By considering (8) and (10), the first order conditions associated to maximize (EC.5) and (EC.6),
with respect to pi and pj, respectively, yield
(v(pi)+ (pi  ci)v0(pi)) ('(pi) '(pj)+ k+⇡ij i ⇡ji j)+ (pi  ci)v(pi)'0(pi) = 0
(v(pj)+ (pj   cj)v0(pj)) ('(pj) '(pi)+ k+⇡ji j  ⇡ji i)+ (pj   cj)v(pj)'0(pj) = 0.
Using definition (12) the above optimal conditions can be rewritten as
 (pi; ci) = '(pj)+ k+⇡ij i ⇡ij j
 (pj; cj) = '(pi)+ k ⇡ij i+⇡ji j.
⇤
Proof for THEOREM 1:
As  (c; c) =  '(c), under Condition C.4 and from Lemma 1 there always exists a value pi 2
[ci; ⌧(ci)) satisfying (23) and pj 2 [cj; ⌧(cj)) satisfying (24), given any value for pj or pi respectively.
Furthermore, this value is unique.
For q 2 [ '(c);1) define
G(q; c)2   1(q; c), G(q; c)< ⌧(c).
Lemma 1 implies G is a continuous and increasing function of q on [ '(c);1).
From this definition, a solution of
pi = G( '(pj)+i; ci) (EC.7)
pj = G( '(pi)+j; cj), (EC.8)
is also a solution of (23)–(24). Define
!i ⌘G( '(⌧(cj))+i; ci), !j ⌘G( '(⌧(ci))+j; cj),
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and note that for any p= (pi, pj) it will hold that p 2 [ci;!i)⇥ [cj;!j). Hence, by considering the
property that  ' is an increasing function, !k < ⌧(ck), for k= {i, j}, and  (c; c) = '(c), we have
 '(ci) '(cj)+i  '(pj)+i < '(⌧(cj))+i
) ci G( '(pj)+i; ci)< !i,
with an equivalent bound holding for !j.
As a consequence, system (EC.7)–(EC.8) defines a fixed-point iteration p =  (p) where   :
[ci;!i)⇥ [cj;!j)! [ci;!i)⇥ [cj;!j) and is continuous on that set. Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem
then implies the existence of a fixed point for  , that will also be a solution for (23)–(24). ⇤
Proof for THEOREM 2:
Consider the fixed-point dynamics for the solution defined by (EC.7)–(EC.8), which we write in
compact form as p= (p), and define the fixed-point iteration
p= j( i(p))⌘ (p), (EC.9)
where  = ( i  j)T and  : [cj; ⌧(cj))! [cj; ⌧(cj)). This iteration is equivalent to (EC.7)–(EC.8),
as any solution of (EC.9) provides a solution for (EC.7)–(EC.8) by letting pj = p and pi =  i(p),
and a solution for (EC.9) can be obtained from (EC.7)–(EC.8) by letting p= pj.
G is di↵erentiable wrt p on [ '(ck);1), k= i, j, and we have that
G0 ( '(p)+i; ci) = v(p)
 0(G( '(p)+i; ci); ci) (EC.10)
G0 ( '( i(p))+j; cj) = v( i(p))
 0(G( '( i(p))+j; cj); cj) . (EC.11)
Using the expression for  0 in (22), we can write
 0(p; c) = v(p)(1+ ⇢(p; c)), (EC.12)
for ⇢ defined in (25). We can rewrite (EC.10)–(EC.11) as
G0 ( '(p)+i; ci) = v(p)
v(G( '(p)+i; ci))
1
1+ ⇢(G( '(p)+i; ci); ci) (EC.13)
G0 ( '( i(p))+j; cj) = v( i(p))
v(G( '( i(p))+j; cj))
⇥ 1
1+ ⇢(G( '( i(p))+j; cj); cj) . (EC.14)
From (EC.9) and using (EC.7)–(EC.8), replacing (EC.13)–(EC.14) and  i(p) =G( '(p)+i; ci)
we have
 0(p) =
v(p)
v(G( '( i(p))+j; cj))
⇥ 1
1+ ⇢(G( '( i(p))+j; cj); cj)
1
1+ ⇢(G( '(p)+i; ci); ci) .
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From Condition C.3’, for all p 2 [c¯k; ⌧(ck)) and k = i, j it holds that 1 + ⇢(p; ck)>
p
v(c¯)/v(⌧¯),
and as we also have v(c¯)  v(c¯j)  v(p)  v(⌧(cj))  v(⌧¯), it follows that
 0(p)<
v(c¯j)
v(⌧(cj))
v(⌧¯)
v(c¯)
< 1,
implying 1  0(p)> 0.
From this bound, p '(p) is striclty increasing on [c¯j; ⌧(cj)), there can only be one zero of the
function in that interval and the fixed point for (EC.9) is unique on [c¯i; ⌧(ci))⇥ [c¯j; ⌧(cj)). ⇤
